INTERNAL SECURITY AFFAIRS: For a fistful of dollars, Israelis are ready to assist Iran in its war against Israel.

Roy Mizrahi and Almog Atias, both 24 and childhood friends, are residents of Nesher, near Haifa. Mizrahi was deep in debt due to a gambling addiction, and Atias was not far behind.

Then an opportunity arose that offered to them a way out of their financial mess.

A member of an online swingers group, Mizrahi made the acquaintance of an anonymous member who asked him to do a bunch of seemingly unrelated and harmless tasks, and in return he was paid handsomely.

First he was told to photograph the area around his home and then document a car dealership’s sales board. He was then asked to burn a note with a message against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Then, the missions became more sinister, and at some point, according to police investigators, Mizrahi became very aware that the people calling the shots were Iranian, and he was doing their beckoning. Next, he transferred a bag buried in the ground he believed to contain a bomb from one location to another. Then, it was time for the main mission.

Together with Atias, who was also recruited by the anonymous online member, a surveillance camera was purchased and the two rented a hotel room in Tel Aviv, before traveling to Kfar Ahim, the southern Israel home of Defense Minister Israel Katz. They were ordered to install a camera facing the access road to Katz’s home, but the mission was aborted due to the presence of security guards.

Defense officials told the court that the surveillance was part of a larger plan to assassinate the defense minister.

MIZRAHI AND Atias are not an abberation. It seems that every couple of weeks a new story emerges about the recruitment of Israelis by Iranian intelligence.

According to a Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) report issued in January, the year 2024 saw a 400% increase in espionage cases compared to the previous year.

Supt. Maor Goren, head of the security division at the Israel Police’s Lahav 433 – The National Crime Unit, told KAN Reshet Bet that the arrest of Mizrahi and Atias marked the 20th case his unit and the Shin Bet have handled over the past year involving Israelis suspected of spying for Iran.

There is no doubt that Tehran has used the period since the start of the Israel-Hamas War to step up its efforts to lure Israelis into spying for the regime. Twenty espionage cases have so far come to public light, and 30 indictments have been filed.

Not all the stories are similar, but some clear patterns emerge. Those recruited are invariably in financial difficulty and are seeking a quick fix to settle debts. Many are new immigrants, often lacking the patriotic attachment to the state most veteran Israelis have.

“Most of those recruited are useless and are on the margins of Israeli society,” explained Yossi Melman, an espionage expert and coauthor of Spies Against Armageddon. “But what’s worrying is that a country dedicated to Israel’s destruction has managed to penetrate Israeli society.”

And Melman has an explanation as to why the Iranians are succeeding. “It’s connected to the disintegration of Israeli society that has been accelerating over recent years. There is no longer cohesion and solidarity,” he explained. “Today it’s each for their own, and even the government only cares about its own survival. People feel that if officials can work for Qatar, why can’t they work for Iran?”

Goren noted, however, that for every individual who accepts the offer, others – also contacted by Iranian operatives – cut off communication and report the approach to the police.

The Iranian recruitment method is relatively simple, lacking sophistication, and without a huge financial outlay or years of planning, involving sleeper cells or similar deep penetration methods. Social media phishing is the preferred recruitment method, and it only takes a few gullible Israelis to take the bait.

The Iranians are targeting haredim, new immigrants, people with a criminal background, and ordinary citizens, often going after those with financial difficulties motivated by the prospect of making some quick money. The targeting of new immigrants – a number of those arrested have been from the former Soviet Union – also may have an unfortunate ripple effect beyond a threat to Israeli security: fostering suspicion and stigmatizing specific demographics among the public.

Furthermore, Iran has been able to cast a wider net, largely thanks to social media, which they leverage to recruit people. The digital approach to recruitment allows Iran to reach segments of the population that they would not have been able to access before the advent of platforms like Telegram.

Iran has reached out to Israelis across social media

You may have unwittingly come across such recruitment attempts yourself. Iranian intelligence has reached out to Israelis on various platforms, including WhatsApp, Facebook, X, LinkedIn, Telegram, and Instagram, offering generous payments for simple tasks such as taking a photo of a particular individual or site, or spraying graffiti. Sometimes the ad will seek a private investigator to obtain information on Israeli officials. There is initially no mention of Iran, and most Israelis who were recruited claimed that, initially at least, they had no idea they were working for Tehran. Other phishing campaigns posted surveys asking Israelis to enter their personal information.

The Shin Bet has an impressive track record in thwarting Iran’s espionage efforts, and so far, as far as we know, there has been no serious damage caused to Israel’s security. However, the espionage effort is ongoing, and it is entirely possible that individuals working for Tehran have still not been exposed.

Criticism has been voiced over lenient sentencing by the courts for the individuals who are enticed by Iranian intelligence. The relatively mild punishments handed down by the courts – usually a few years in prison – are unlikely to deter people who are tempted by Iran’s generous cash payments.

And for Iran, the capture of individuals or a cell operating on its behalf has no consequences at all. The spymasters in Tehran merely wait patiently until the next victim answers their social media messages.

Moshe Attias, an 18-year-old resident of Yavne, received the following message. “Thank you for contacting Iranian intelligence. To speak with our experts, send a message to the Telegram user below.”

Attias received around $1,800 via a digital wallet to document the ward in the Meir Medical Center in Kfar Saba where former prime minister Naftali Bennett was staying when hospitalized for a week in April. Attias, posing as a relative of Bennett, also described to his Iranian handlers the security arrangements in place in the hospital for the former prime minister.

Last August, Israeli police arrested 73-year-old Moti Maman, from Ashkelon, for allegedly plotting to assassinate Netanyahu, then-defense minister Yoav Gallant, and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar. Maman was smuggled into Iran twice to meet with his Iranian handlers. In Iran, he allegedly requested an advance payment of $1 million, according to the indictment against him.

“Getting so close to Bennett is an achievement for the Iranians, and it shows they are still trying,” explained Melman. “But still, their efforts pale into insignificance when compared to Israeli intelligence penetration of Iran. Maman told his handlers there was no way he could get access to top-level officials and suggested instead the mayors of Acre or Nahariya.”

In March a resident of Beersheba was arrested on suspicion of offering to sell an Iranian agent information on the Negev Nuclear Research Center.

Last year a couple were recruited by an Iranian intelligence network that specifically focuses on Jewish immigrants to Israel from the Caucasus region, after being initially approached by an Israeli national with Azerbaijani origins. According to the indictment the couple received $600 per day for gathering information on potential targets, including surveillance of Mossad headquarters.

A seven-member Haifa cell, indicted last year, allegedly photographed dozens of military bases, Iron Dome batteries and other strategic sites across Israel, receiving between $500 and $1,200 per task. According to the indictment, one of their surveillance targets was the Nevatim Air Force Base, which was later hit in an Iranian missile strike.

Not all those recruited are Jewish. Last October seven Palestinians from east Jerusalem were arrested after being recruited by Tehran. The cell plotted to assassinate an Israeli nuclear scientist and the mayor of a major city.

To date, the Iranian espionage efforts don’t appear to have resulted in a spectacular success, and through a combination of digital surveillance and undercover operations the Shin Bet has succeeded in thwarting Iranian efforts. No senior Israeli figures have been assassinated. The surveillance efforts may have provided Tehran with real-time intelligence on more than one occasion but do not amount to a game changer.

“But we don’t know what we don’t know, and what’s really worrying is that Israelis are ready to betray their homeland for a fistful of dollars,” said Melman.

Herb Keinon contributed to this report.